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In order for the maritime sector to align itself with the 
targets set by the Paris Agreement, it should reduce its GHG 
emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 with the 
ultimate aim to phase them out entirely. It is along these lines 
that in April 2018 the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) developed a strategy, consisting of a range of potential 
technical and operational measures to reduce GHG emissions 
from international shipping, ranking from improvements on 
ship design to the employment of alternative fuels. In order to 
stimulate the adoption of these policies, the IMO also considers 
the implementation of market-based measures (MBM) that will 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The environmental and energy efficiency performance 
of shipping is better than any other mode of freight transport, 
accounting for 2.2 % of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (Smith et al., 2014). Shipping’s contribution to GHG 
emissions, though, is predicted to increase by 50-250 % by 2050, 
in case no energy efficiency measures are implemented or no 
shift to alternative fuels is realised. GHG emissions reduction 
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provide additional incentives to shipowners to invest in new 
technologies and uptake of cleaner fuels. The MBMs analysed in 
this paper include two different policies proposed by different 
countries and associations for the abatement of GHG emissions 
from shipping: a) the International Fund for GHG emissions from 
ships that includes the imposition of a global levy on marine 
bunker fuel for all vessels and b) the Maritime Emission Trading 
System (METS) that requires all maritime companies to buy/sell 
emission allowances to meet their annual emission reductions 
targets, setting a cap on global shipping emissions. This paper 
presents and analyses these two diverse MBMs, highlighting 
their main advantages and drawbacks. The scope of this paper 
is to investigate the potential of these MBMs to incentivise 
investments in new technologies and alternative fuels, both 
essential for the decarbonisation of the maritime sector. 
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targets from international shipping are not included in the Paris 
Agreement that seeks to achieve net zero emissions the soonest 
possible, and certainly well before the end of this century 
(UNCTAD, 2015; UNCTAD, 2016). In order for the maritime 
sector to align itself with the targets set by the Paris Agreement, 
it should reduce its GHG emissions by at least 50 % by 2050 
compared to 2008 with the ultimate aim to phase them out 
entirely. It is along these lines that in April 2018 the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) developed a strategy, consisting 
of a range of potential technical and operational measures to 
reduce GHG emissions from international shipping, ranking from 
improvements on ship design to the employment of alternative 
fuels (IMO, 2018). 
In order to stimulate the adoption of these policies, the IMO 
also considers the implementation of market-based measures 
(MBM) that will provide additional incentives to shipowners 
to invest in new technologies and uptake of cleaner fuels 
(Lagouvardou et al., 2020; Ölcer et al., 2018; Goulielmos et al., 
2011; Nikolakaki, 2013; Psaraftis, 2012; IMO, 2003; Christodoulou, 
2019; Miola et al., 2011). Evidence and literature clearly suggest 
that the implementation of technical or operational measures 
alone could not result in sufficient emissions reductions, given 
the expected growth of shipping, but innovative solutions and 
combinations need to be developed (Shi, 2016; Bouman et al., 
2017; Christodoulou and Woxenius, 2019). In this sense MBMs 
can play a complementary role and accelerate the adoption of 
technical and operational solutions aiming at the reduction of 
GHG emissions from shipping (Kosmas and Acciaro, 2017).  
This paper presents and analyses two diverse MBMs that 
have been proposed by different countries and associations 
to the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) for 
the abatement of GHG emissions from shipping. These MBM 
proposals include: a) the International Fund for GHG emissions 
from ships that includes the imposition of a global levy on marine 
bunker fuel for all vessels and b) the Maritime Emission Trading 
System (METS) that requires all maritime companies to buy/sell 
emissions allowances to meet their annual emission reductions 
targets, thereby setting a cap on global shipping emissions. 
Although the potential of these MBMs to reduce GHG emissions 
from shipping has been studied in recent academic articles, the 
main advantages and drawbacks of each MBM have not been 
clarified based on the existing academic literature and relevant 
MEPC resolutions and it is exactly this research gap that our 
paper aims at filling A comprehensive comparison of the two 
‘predominant’ MBMs for the maritime sector is developed in this 
study considering the previous experience from the adoption of 
these MBMs in different industrial sectors for the abatement of 
GHG emissions from their operations.  
The scope of this paper is to investigate the potential of 
these MBMs to incentivise investments in new technologies 
and alternative fuels, both essential for the decarbonisation 
of the maritime sector. To achieve this, a brief presentation 
of the economic theory of externalities is included in this 
paper, highlighting the way MBMs can contribute towards the 
internalisation of the external cost of GHG emissions from the 
maritime sector. Our results suggest that MBMs are beneficial as 
complementary to technical and operational initiatives and can 
be considered additional tools in the toolbox of solutions for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from the maritime sector.
The paper is structured in the following way: the 
methodology is presented in Section 2, consisting of a brief 
presentation of the economic theory of externalities and a short 
description of the MBMs under consideration (a global levy on 
marine fuel and a METS); Section 3 includes an analysis and 
comparison of the two MBMs, while our conclusions are drawn 
in Section 4.
2. METHODOLOGY
In order to identify the main advantages and drawbacks of 
a global levy on marine bunker fuel for all vessels and a METS 
for the abatement of GHG emissions from shipping, as well as 
their overall GHG emission reduction potential, the economic 
theory of externalities is analysed in this section in addition to 
the existing academic literature and relevant MEPC resolutions 
on proposed MBMs for the maritime sector.  
Internalisation of the external cost from GHG emissions in the 
maritime sector
In general, GHG emissions can be considered as an ‘external 
cost’ from the industrial production and the use of fossil fuels 
that has a negative ‘social’ impact, a ‘social cost’ that is not borne 
by the producers and does not form part of their production 
costs (Baumol, 1972). The market failure to ‘internalise’ this cost 
is the main reason why GHG emissions and climate change are 
characterised as ‘the greatest example of market failure we have 
ever seen’ (Stern, 2006). 
If we add an extra supply curve in a standard supply and 
demand figure, we obtain an illustration of the economic analysis 
of externalities. The initial supply curve represents the marginal 
private cost for the production of a product or service, while the 
extra supply curve includes the marginal social cost, the ‘total’ 
cost for the production of a product or service, including the cost 
from the associated GHG emissions (Figure 1). 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the marginal social cost (MSC) 
of products or services is larger than the marginal private cost 
(MPC) by the amount of the external cost, which is in our case 
the cost of GHG emissions. The vertical distance between the 
two supply curves represents the ‘pollution’ cost, assuming there 
are no external benefits and social benefit equals individual 
benefit (with the demand curve remaining the same). If this 
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Figure 1.
Graphical representation of negative externalities Source: Adapted from Cornes and Sandler (1996).
Figure 2.
Supply and demand curves of shipping with external costs Source: Adapted from Cornes and Sandler (1996).
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environmental cost is not internalised, the producers will only 
take into account their own private cost and produce at a price 
Pp and quantity Qp, instead of the price Ps and quantity Qs, 
which corresponds to the ‘social optimum’ level of production. 
The ‘ideal’ social equilibrium can be found at Ps and quantity 
Qs, where the marginal social benefit (MSB) equals the marginal 
social cost (MSC).
When it comes to the maritime industry, the demand curve 
for international shipping services is almost vertical due to the 
inelastic demand of these services that do not face competition 
by any other mode of transport. Deep sea shipping services 
involved in transferring crude oil, oil products, dry bulk cargo, 
and containers at various destinations around the world, cannot 
be replaced by any other transport mode. The almost vertical 
demand curve of the shipping industry means that the demand 
for deep sea shipping services is inelastic and does not essentially 
follow freight rate changes. In this sense, the imposition of a 
global levy on marine bunkers or the need to purchase emission 
allowances within an emission trading scheme, would have an 
impact on ship owners and ship operators, who would need to 
supply their services adapting to increased operating costs. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, shipowners and ship operators would need 
to produce their services at Ps freight rate in order to include 
the social cost from their operations and achieve the ‘ideal’ 
equilibrium (Ps,Qs), accomplishing the “optimum” benefit for the 
society as a whole. 
In order to overcome the market inefficiencies and equal 
social benefits to social costs for the production of maritime 
services, the internalisation of the associated external costs 
is essential. As regards the maritime sector, the international 
regulatory agency responsible for safety and environmental 
pollution issues for international shipping is the IMO that has 
made some progress towards the abatement of GHG emissions, 
including discussions and negotiations between involved parties 
on the MBMs that could internalise the total external costs of 
maritime services, making them equal to the external benefits. 
There are various MBMs that have been proposed by a number 
of countries, with most of them falling under the umbrella of a 
global levy scheme on marine bunker fuel or a METS. 
3. PRESENTATION OF THE MBMs 
During the last decade, the MEPC of the IMO has worked 
on the establishment of technical and operational measures 
to reduce GHG emissions from ships. Since January 2013, two 
of these measures – the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) 
and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) – 
have been made mandatory for all vessels, irrespective of their 
registration flag or shipowner’s nationality. Apart from this 
development, the IMO has started working on the development 
of MBMs that could supplement technical and operational 
measures and stimulate investments in more energy-efficient 
ships (IMO, 2007; Giziakis and Christodoulou, 2009). The need for 
the adoption of MBMs for the limitation of GHG emissions from 
shipping becomes more apparent today, as the growth of global 
seaborne trade during the last decade has faded out the energy 
efficiency improvements achieved from the introduction of the 
relevant mandatory regulations.
During MEPC 60 (2010) different MBMs were proposed 
by a number of countries and were discussed at the IMO. As 
summarised by Lagouvardou et al. (2020), Cyprus, Denmark, the 
Marshall Islands, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, and the International 
Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) have proposed the introduction 
of a global levy on marine bunker fuel and the development of 
the International Fund for GHG emissions from ships. On the 
other hand, Norway, UK, France, and Germany have proposed the 
establishment of a global METS. 
4. A GLOBAL LEVY SCHEME ON MARINE BUNKER FUEL
The development of an International Fund for GHG 
emissions from ships, based on a global levy on marine bunker 
fuel, was supported as an efficient MBM for the reduction of 
shipping GHG emissions by many involved parties (IMO, 2007b; 
IMO, 2008; IMO, 2010a). This scheme would require from all ships 
to pay a ‘levy’ on every ton of bunker fuel purchased. These ‘levies’ 
should not be uniform for all marine fuels, but should be set 
taking into account the different emission factors of each fuel. 
The funds from these ‘levies’ could either be collected through 
bunker fuel suppliers or paid directly by shipowners and would 
be used to establish an International Fund for GHG emissions 
from ships that would then finance the offsetting activities of 
GHG emissions from ships. 
The International Fund for GHG emissions from ships 
would need to gather funds to offset the amount of current GHG 
emissions from international shipping that exceeds the global 
emissions reduction target, set by either UNFCCC or IMO. In order 
to achieve this target, the International Fund for GHG emissions 
from ships would need to adjust the ‘levy’ rate on marine fuel on a 
regular basis in order to secure the required funds to finance the 
necessary offsetting activities and achieve the agreed reduction 
target for maritime GHG emissions. Any additional funds 
remaining in the International Fund would be used for funding 
either Research & Development in shipping or the development 
of an IMO technical cooperation program to assist developing 
countries in improving the energy efficiency performance of 
their fleet. 
The impact of a ‘carbon levy’ on marine fuel on the 
shipowners and ship operators’ decisions will be significant, as fuel 
costs represent a substantial part of the vessels’ operational costs, 
in many cases reaching one third of the voyage costs. The increase 
in fuels costs will depend largely both on the fuel consumption 
TRANSACTIONS ON MARITIME SCIENCE 5Trans. marit. sci. 2021; 01: xx-xx
and the quality of the fuel purchased, as less ‘polluting’ fuels will 
be subject to lower ‘levies’. In this way, shipowners and operators 
will be incentivised to reduce fuel use, shift to cleaner fuels and 
improve the overall energy performance of their fleet (Chupka, 
2004). In general, marine fuel demand responds to changes in 
marine fuel price and can consequently have a significant impact 
on the associated GHG emissions. 
The response of shipowners and ship operators to a marine 
fuel levy can differ widely, depending on the market conditions, 
technical advances, operational improvements, the existence 
and availability of alternative fuels. The marine fuel demand 
and the associated GHG emissions can alternatively be reduced 
by limiting maritime traffic, investing in ship engines and ship 
design modifications, improving operating practices such as 
weather routing and sailing speed, using alternative/renewable 
fuels, shifting to different vessel types (Rodrigue et al., 2009).
5. A MARITIME EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (METS)
Another MBM discussed in the IMO and supported by a 
number of countries – namely Norway, UK, France and Germany 
– as a complementary means of the abatement of GHG emissions 
from international shipping is the METS (IMO, 2010b; IMO, 
2010c). The design of a METS is quite more complicated than 
a global levy on marine fuel. Under this scheme, a cap on GHG 
emissions from international shipping would need to be set in 
order for the maritime industry to contribute towards the global 
emissions reductions target set by the Paris Agreement, as well 
as the target set by the Initial IMO GHG emissions strategy on 
reducing GHG emissions from international shipping by at least 
50 % by 2050 compared to 2008 (IMO, 2011; IMO, 2018). After 
setting this cap, an emission trading mechanism needs to be 
developed to assist shipping companies in meeting this cap and 
achieving the necessary emissions reductions in a cost-effective 
way (Faber et al., 2010). A shipping company that can reduce its 
emissions below the determined commitment for any reason 
(newer vessels, adoption of new technologies, use of alternative 
fuels, improved operational performance) can sell its surplus 
emission allowances to another company that cannot meet its 
emission reduction target. In this way, the overall abatement cost 
of meeting the emission reduction targets will be restricted to a 
bare minimum. 
Under the METS, emission allowances would be attributed 
to each ship, correlating to the ‘expected’ CO2 emissions from 
its operations. These emission allowances would be periodically 
submitted, and each ship would need to submit an annual 
emission report to the administration of the METS for approval, 
including their bunker consumption, to facilitate the relevant 
inspection from the port state controls. An international entity 
– probably the IMO – would administrate and regulate a METS 
that would provide easy access to the emission allowances for all 
ships. A METS could either be open for trade with other emission 
trading schemes and include out-of-sector allowances or closed, 
including only shipping emissions. The inclusion of shipping in 
an open METS would mean that the maritime industry could 
purchase emission allowances from other sectors and vice versa. 
A recent development in this direction comes from the 
European Commission stating that there is an urgent need to 
also reduce GHG emissions from the maritime sector in order 
to meet EU’s goal to become climate neutral by 2050 (European 
Commission, 2019). According to the EC, the inclusion of 
maritime emissions in the EU-Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) 
is one of the measures that could assist in the decarbonisation 
of the European transport sector and immediate action needs 
to be taken by relevant stakeholders at both European and 
international level (EU, 2018; EU, 2015). 
6. ADVANTAGES – DISADVANTAGES OF THE DIFFERENT 
MBMs
MBMs are divided among ‘price’ and ‘quantity’ measures, 
according to the way they influence market forces, and proceed 
with the internalisation of externalities and, in this case, the 
abatement of GHG emissions from the maritime sector (Weitzman, 
1974). Based on their nature – ‘price’ or ‘quantity’ measures - they 
present some pros and cons that are uniform across the various 
industrial sectors. A METS is a quantity measure that determines 
the cap of overall emissions (quantity) and allows prices to 
vary. Given the market volatility of the shipping industry, with 
unpredictable future supply and demand conditions, a quantity 
measure creates an increased uncertainty towards the future 
price of emission allowances, and it is the industry, not the 
regulatory body, that must bear the cost of adapting to these 
volatile market conditions (Giziakis et al., 2014). The pros of a 
quantity measure, like an ETS, is that the emissions cap is set in 
advance and there are no opportunities for corruption that might 
be the case under volatile market conditions. 
On the other hand, a levy on marine fuels is a price measure 
that determines the price (levy) of emissions and allows the 
quantity of GHG emissions to vary according to economic activity 
(Hepburn, 2006). In this sense, a marine fuel levy might decrease 
maritime traffic, as the shipowners and operators will seek to 
retain their profits facing increased fuel and operational costs. 
Under this scheme, the uncertainty from the volatile market 
conditions will be borne by the regulatory agency, as the level of 
the levy is predetermined.
Given the high uncertainty in the compliance costs of 
shipping firms and the constant evolution of technological and 
operational trends, the optimum choice for the maritime industry 
seems to be a price scheme that eliminates the uncertainty from 
the volatile market conditions for the industry. If we take into 
consideration, though, that definite reductions in maritime GHG 
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Table 4.
Risk table representing probability of cyber incident upon survey results.
emissions are required for the shipping industry to align itself 
to the IPCC’s goal that could prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the environment, a quantity measure that sets 
the emissions cap for international shipping might be a better 
choice that provides a higher degree of certainty. 
If we assume that the regulatory body and the shipping 
sector can equally adapt to volatile market conditions, the 
suitability of the MBM depends on the potential of both the 
abatement costs and the environmental benefits to adjust 
to these changing market conditions. Given the long-term 
impact of GHG emissions, a levy on marine fuel seems to be 
more environmentally efficient than a METS, due to its better 
adjustment to cost fluctuations. By setting a cap on maritime 
emissions each year, the abatement cost of emission reductions 
is not taken into consideration under a METS. These abatement 
costs can vary widely over years, depending on many parameters, 
such as new emerging low carbon technologies and alternative 
fuels, different economic activity level and other factors. In 
the case of a global levy on marine fuel, the abatement cost of 
cutting emissions is predominant in the decision-making process 
of the shipping companies as they have an increased incentive to 
improve their carbon footprint when the associated abatement 
A global levy on marine fuels A METS
Strengths - Better adjustment to cost fluctuations/ 
Achievement of a long-term target for GHG 
emissions 
- Easier to implement/ Existing structure
- No opportunities for corruption/ Emission cap set 
in advance 
- Definite reductions in maritime GHG emissions per 
year
Weaknesses - Potential decrease in maritime traffic  
- Reductions in GHG emissions that vary according to 
the economic activity
- Increased uncertainty/ Need to adapt to volatile 
market conditions 
- Need for a new administrative infrastructure 
- High start-up costs
Source: Own elaboration based on the literature review conducted
costs are relatively low compared to periods when these costs 
are particularly high. 
Apart from their environmental effectiveness and the 
economic efficiency, parameters related to the practical 
implementation of the MBMs need to be examined, 
including the facility of their adoption and the height of the 
associated administrative costs. When it comes to the practical 
implementation of a global levy on marine fuels and a METS, the 
design of both schemes could follow either an ‘upstream’ or a 
‘downstream’ approach. Under an ‘upstream’ approach of a levy 
scheme, the marine fuel suppliers would be taxed or regulated, 
whereas the users of these fuels – the shipping companies – 
would be involved in a ‘downstream’ design. 
Comparing the adoption of an ‘upstream’ levy on marine 
fuels to an ‘upstream’ METS, the former seems much easier 
to implement given the existing previous experience and 
infrastructure from the adoption of energy levies in other 
industrial sectors. An ETS would need to build on a new 
administrative infrastructure, implying higher start-up costs 
compared to a levy on marine fuels to proceed with the initial 
allocation (grandfathering) of emission allowances to the 
participant parties.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this paper we have tried to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of a global levy on marine bunker fuel 
and a METS as complementary measures that could stipulate 
investments in green technologies and use of alternative fuels 
for the abatement of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
Both MBMs seem promising as they provide flexibility about the 
way the external costs of GHG emissions could be internalised and 
the equation of social benefits to social costs for the production 
of maritime services could be achieved. MBMs set either the 
quantity of emissions that the maritime sector is allowed to 
generate (METS) or the price of these emissions (a global levy), 
thereby incentivising shipping companies to improve their 
energy performance and reduce their emissions. 
According to our findings, the adoption of a global levy on 
marine bunker fuel seems to be more efficient for the reduction 
of maritime GHG emissions compared to a METS, mainly due 
to the volatile market conditions of the maritime industry. 
Although the setting of an emission cap under a METS would 
ensure definite reductions in GHG emissions per year, a global 
levy on marine bunkers would adjust better to cost fluctuations 
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and the achievement of a long-term target for GHG emissions. 
Additionally, it would be much easier to implement in practice 
in contrast to a METS that would require a new administrative 
infrastructure and high start-up costs.
Both the IMO and the EU are currently focusing on 
the development of a global or regional MBM that could 
complement the technical and operational measures already 
adopted for the abatement of GHG emissions from the maritime 
sector. This paper sheds light on some aspects of the problem, 
highlighting fundamental differences among the predominant 
MBMs under discussion at the moment, and underlining their 
main advantages and drawbacks, while aiming at contributing 
towards the discussion for the adoption of an environmentally 
effective and economically efficient MBM for the abatement of 
GHG emissions from international shipping.
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